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This paper focuses on the implications of Decentralized Education (DE) and Cen-
tralized Public Education (CPE) for growth and welfare in an overlapping gener-
ations model. Individuals choose learning time, consumption and human capital.
Under DE, there is no government intervention, while in CPE, human capital is
augmented by public education expenditures ￿nanced by a distortionary income
tax, where the latter is chosen by a benevolent ￿scal authority. CPE is welfare
superior to DE for moderate/strong preferences over human capital bequests and
medium/high elacticities of human capital with respect to average public educa-
tion spending, average and parental human capital. So, even if we abstract from
equity considerations, education policy may be supported on welfare grounds.
Keywords: Economic development. Educational ￿nance. National govern-
ment expenditures and education.
JEL classi￿cation: O100, I220, H520.1 Introduction
In Europe, North America and elsewhere, there is currently a strong debate on
alternative ways of ￿nancing activities that have public good features and involve
positive externalities, since competitive equilibria are typically ine¢ cient in such
cases. Education is one of the most important activities with public good charac-
terictics, since human capital accumulation plays a crucial role in the process of
economic growth and income distribution in modern economies (Nehru, Swanson
& Dubey, 1995). As a result, we have seen signi￿cant government involvement in
the funding and provision of education worldwide. Usually, primary and secondary
education are mandatory and provided by the government and higher education is
heavily subsidized (e.g by deducting educational spending from taxable income).
Education can also be viewed as a mechanism of intergenerational transfers,
since it usually takes place at the beginning of the life cycle and is ￿nanced by
resources provided by the old generation.1 These transfers are altruistically mo-
tivated and a⁄ect economic growth, income distribution and welfare through their
impact on human capital accumulation (Barro, 2001). Altruistic decisions lead
generally to ine¢ cient outcomes and parental decisions about o⁄spring education,
which ignore the impact of individual human capital accumulation on economy-
wide human capital, are a classic example of such decisions. This view of education
agrees with Lucas￿(1988) view that human capital is a ￿ social activity, involv-
ing groups of people in a way that has no counterpart with the accumulation of
physical capital￿ .
This work complements three strands of literature on: a) human capital as an
engine of growth (Lucas 1988, Azariadis & Drazen, 1990, Temple 2001, Doppel-
hofer, G., Miller R.I & X. Sala-i-Martin, 2004); b) alternative ways of ￿nancing
1Roughly 5% of GDP is transferred to the young generation through public education in the
OECD countries.
1education (Epple & Romano, 1998, Meier, 2000, Soares, 2003); c) widespread
public provision and ￿nancing of education as a way to indoctrinate and instill
social norms and values e.g by reducing the rent-seeking incentives between com-
petitive groups of heterogeneous agents (Gradstein, M. 2000, Gradstein, M. & M.
Justman, 2000, 2002, 2004, Thum, C. & S. Uebelmesser, 2003).
In this paper, we compare the general equilibrium implications of three educa-
tion systems, Decentralized Education (DE), Centralized Education (CE) and
Centralized Public Education (CPE) using an overlapping generations model
based on Glomm-Ravikumar (1992). All systems are characterized by average
human capital externalities for each individual, i.e the return to individual educa-
tion increases with average human capital. In DE, each agent maximizes welfare
by treating average human capital as a public good, while CE di⁄ers only in that a
social planner internalizes average human capital externalities. Under CPE, there
is also education policy, i.e individual human capital accumulation is enhanced
by public education expenditures ￿nanced by a distortionary income tax. The
latter is chosen by a benevolent ￿scal authority, which maximizes the utility of
the representative old agent accounting for human capital externalities.We focus
on DE and CPE, which are second-best environments, since in the former mar-
ket fails due to externalities, while the latter involves also policy failures due to
distortionary income taxes.
In the analysis, we use a richer human capital accumulation speci￿cation than
other studies (Glomm, G. & B. Ravikumar, 1992, Cardak, 1999, 2004b, Preston,
2003) including time devoted to education, average human capital, average public
education spending (in CPE) and parental human capital.2 We also incorporate
average human capital transfers, consumption and leisure in the utility function
and assume that agents put di⁄erent weight on the various components of utility,
2We should note here that there is no conclusive evidence on the choice of the production
function for human capital (De La Croix, D & P. Michel, 2002).
2in contrast with most of the literature (Glomm, G. & B. Ravikumar, 2001, Zhang
1996). The presence of average human capital bequests, average human capital
and average public education spending guarantees that our results are not in￿ u-
enced by scale e⁄ects, which characterize some of the existing work (Glomm, G. &
B. Ravikumar, 1998, Blankenau, W.F & N.B Simpson, 2004) and are ambiguous
empirically at best. Finally, we endogenize the tax rate, that is sometimes taken
as exogenous (Kaganovich, M. & I. Zilcha, 1999, Cardak, 2005).
We characterize human capital decisions and optimal economic policy and
compare mainly DE and CPE in terms of endogenous variables and welfare. We
derive analytical results, which are mostly ambiguous depending on parameter
values, therefore we conduct numerical simulations based on well-accepted pa-
rameter values in the empirical literature to obtain a ranking of the education
systems.
The main ￿nding is that CPE is welfare superior to DE for moderate/strong
preferences over human capital bequests and medium/high elacticities of human
capital with respect to average public education spending, average and parental
human capital in a neoclassical growth economy. The inverse holds for the re-
maining parameter values.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes the models with-
out education policy, i.e DE and CE. Section 3 studies CPE. Section 4 examines
the dynamics of DE and CPE. Section 5 compares the two systems. Section 6
concludes the paper. Details are contained in the Appendix.
2 Private education
2.1 Decentralized education
The analysis will be pursued in the context of an overlapping generations economy,
comprised of N two-period-lived agents. Each generation consists of identical
3individuals, so it is characterized by a representative agent.3 In the second
period of life, each individual has one child, so population growth is zero.4
Agents derive utility from leisure when young and consumption and average
human capital passed on to the o⁄spring when old. Average human capital cor-
responds to the education quality transferred to the young generation in Glomm,
G. & B. Ravikumar (1992), but is more general in the sense that it incorporates
all factors that in￿ uence human capital evolution. In other words, parents are
happier if their children live in a more knowledge-based economy, since that en-
hances their learning possibilities, therefore their income (see equations (3), (15)
below). This formulation accords with the ever-increasing importance of knowl-
edge since the beginning of the information revolution two decades ago.5 So,
the ￿rst linkage between generations is average human capital bequests, which
re￿ ect education-inclined altruism of the parents toward children referred in the
literature as ￿ joy of giving￿(or ￿ warm glove￿ ), because parents have a preference
for giving to their descendants.6
The second channel through which parents and children are connected is the
stock of parental human capital, which a⁄ects children￿ s learning, since a young
individual inherits partially the human capital of the parents, i.e there is inter-
generational transmission of ability, knowledge, skills and way of thinking within
the family that does not operate through formal schooling but at home (informal
3The solution concept of symmetric equilibria has been widely used in both the public eco-
nomics and game-theoretic literatures (Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, 1994).
4For an examination of the impact of variable population growth on economic growth see
e.g. De La Croix, D. & M. Doepke, 2004.
5The assumption that parents gain utility from average human capital bequethed to their
children, simpli￿es the analysis, but the results would not change in any important way if
individual human capital was used instead.
6Generally, reasons for bequests are altruism on behalf of the parents, provision of incentives
such that their heirs behave according to what parents believe is appropriate and accidental
death of retired individuals who are unable to buy actuarially fair annuities. In the absence of
a bequest motive it would be di¢ cult to explain why even very wealthy individuals maintain
large asset balances at death (Azariadis, 1993).
4education). Parental human capital might also a⁄ect children￿ s human capital
through the quality of parental tutoring (Belzil, C. & J. Hansen, 2003, Restuccia,
D. & C. Urrutia, 2004). So, the more educated parents are, the more help they
are likely to give to their o⁄spring and the more educated the latter are likely to
be.7
Furthermore, average economy-wide human capital generates a positive exter-
nality in the accumulation of private human capital, acting as an input to private
human capital evolution, i.e there is cross-individual spillover. This externality
can be rationalized in several ways. For example, it has been argued that educa-
tion contributes to a stable and democratic society, inculcates acceptable social
values and behavioural norms, lowers crime, thus law enforcement costs and pro-
motes social cohesion (Hanushek, 2002). 8
Also, one unit of time is available for each agent in every period. During the
￿rst period, time is divisible in leisure and schooling, while in the second period
all time is supplied in the labour market. The bene￿t of an increase in schooling in
the ￿rst period is higher human capital (income) in the second period and the cost
is lower leisure in the ￿rst period, therefore there is a trade-o⁄ between income
and leisure.
In this framework, under DE, each agent optimizes with respect to leisure




as given. So, he/she maximizes the utility function:
U





7We could also include private education spending in human capital accumulation in the
spirit of Cardak (2004a). However, this would not change the results qualitatively.
8Furthermore, positive e⁄ects of educational attainment on civic engagement in the form of
voter participation and support for free speech as well as quality of civic knowledge as measured
by newspaper readership have been con￿rmed empirically (Dee, 2004).
9The consumption of the children is included in the parents￿consumption.
10The superscript DE stands for decentralized education.
5subject to
ht+1 = ct+1 (2)






where nt 2 [0;1] and (1 ￿ nt) stands for time devoted to education in period
t. Also, ht+1 is individual human capital in t + 1, and Ht; ht are predetermined
and correspond to average human capital and parental human capital in t respec-
tively.11
The last element of the utility function re￿ ects ad hoc altruism, i.e ￿joy of
giving￿ . The welfare from leaving a bequest depends on the size of the bequest
and b, the degree of parental altruism towards children. Parameter ￿ re￿ ects
preference for leisure. These parameters are assumed constant over time, i.e they
pass from parents to children, assuming that preferences are transmitted across
generations.
Furthermore, given the assumption that agents supply one unit of labour in-
elastically in the second period, ht+1 stands for income and the wage rate. Equa-
tion (2) is the budget constraint of the representative family, showing that income
is devoted entirely to consumption. Relation (3) is a Cobb-Douglas production
function for human capital, where A > 0 is a technological parameter that stands
for total factor productivity in the human capital formation technology and is af-
fected by the organization of schools, attitudes to learning etc. Also, ￿;￿;￿ 2 (0;1)
are the elacticities of learning with regard to time devoted to education, initial
11Regarding human capital accumulation, empirical studies show that the quality of education,
measured e.g by the student/teacher ratio, term length or relative pay of teachers, in￿ uences
positively the rate of return of individuals to education, therefore their future income (Card, D.
& A.B Krueger, 1992). Furthermore, time spent on human capital investment is expected to
have a positive e⁄ect on school performance.
6average human capital and parental human capital respectively, so that all factors
exhibit diminishing returns. So, human capital accumulation depends positively
on time devoted to schooling (1 ￿ nt), average human capital in t and parental
human capital.
















































Equation (4) indicates that learning/leisure choices are constant over time and
independent of the parental attributes (ht), because the income and substitution
e⁄ects balance each other perfectly.13 The stronger the preference over leisure (￿)
and the smaller the elasticity of human capital accumulation with regard to time
devoted to it (￿), the higher is optimal leisure and the lower learning time. Also,
consumption, income and total human capital in period t + 1 depend positively
on learning e¢ ciency (A) and inherited human capital (ht). Finally, income,
consumption and aggregate human capital depend negatively on the preference
over leisure (￿).
2.2 Social planner￿ s problem
In order to check if the outcome of the decentralized education system presented
above is Pareto optimal, we study the social planner￿ s problem. The planner
12The second-order conditions hold.
13This is due to log-linear preferences.
7internalizes the positive externalities of average human capital on welfare and
private human capital accumulation. Thus, he/she optimizes with respect to nt








































































Equations (10)-(12) give similar results to relations (4)-(6). The basic di⁄er-
ence comes from the fact that leisure and time devoted to education di⁄er between
CE and DE. Speci￿cally, optimal learning time is a positive function of the pref-
erence parameter over average human capital bequests (b) under CE, which is
14The superscript CE stands for centralized education.
16The second-order conditions hold.
8not the case under DE, since the social planner takes into account the human
capital externalities on welfare and human capital accumulation contrary to DE.
As a result, time devoted to learning, human capital and consumption are higher
under CE compared to DE.
Consequently, the decentralized solution (DE) does not coincide with the social
optimum (CE), therefore DE represents a second-best environment.
3 Centralized public education
We now assume that the human capital stock of individual agents is augmented
by the government in the form of public education expenditures on e.g. libraries,
schools, teachers￿and university professors￿salaries and training (Papke, 2004).
These expenditures are ￿nanced by a distortionary tax on t+1 income. A possible
interpretation of the simultaneous presence of private and public factors in the
production of human capital (they are complements), is that the majority of pub-
lic education spending ￿nances primary and secondary education, while private
expenditure ￿nances mainly preschool/tertiary education and on the job-training.
Events take place in two stages. First, a centralized ￿scal authority chooses
the tax rate and the associated level of government expenditures. Second, agents
choose consumption and leisure (therefore time devoted to education) taking eco-
nomic policy as given. However, we solve the problem backward.
3.1 Household behaviour
The representative agent born in period t chooses nt; ct+1 taking average human
capital in t; t+1 and the income tax rate as given to maximize lifetime utility as
follows:
9U






ct+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)ht+1 (14)








Equation (14) states that consumption equals net (after-tax) income. Relation
(15) represents the human capital production function, which di⁄ers compared






Equations (14)-(15) imply that











































17The superscript CPE stands for centralized public education.
18The second-order conditions are also satis￿ed.
10The results are analogous to those obtained under DE. The di⁄erences between
DE and CPE are as follows: a) Individual consumption is lower than human
capital in CPE in contrast with DE due to the imposition of the income tax; b)
human capital accumulation is augmented by government education expenditures
in CPE, which are not present under DE.
3.2 Government budget constraint
The government runs a balanced budget. It uses revenues from a proportional
income tax (￿) and allocates them to spending on human capital (Gt+1).
Given that there are N private agents, the government budget constraint and
average education spending are respectively:








Equations (20)-(21) imply that economic policy is summarized by ￿:
3.3 Optimal economic policy
To endogenize economic policy, it is su¢ cient to determine the independent policy
instrument (￿). A centralized ￿scal authority, that maximizes the utility of the
representative household given in (13) with respect to ￿ acts as a benevolent
Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the private sector by taking into account the private
equilibrium.
Substituting (17)-(19), (21) into (13) and di⁄erentiating with respect to ￿, the
optimal tax rate is the following:19
￿ =
￿(1 + b)
￿(1 + b) + 1 ￿ ￿
(22)
19The second-order condition of the problem holds.
11The tax rate is constant over time due to log-linear preferences and Cobb-
Douglas learning technology and depends positively on the strength of the prefer-
ences over average human capital bequests (b) and the elacticity of human capital
with regard to average public education expenditures (￿). This is expected, since
the higher the utility agents derive from providing bequests to their descendants
and the more productive are public education expenditures in terms of human
capital accumulation, the more money individuals will be willing to pay for the
subsidization of human capital accumulation, which implies a higher optimal tax
rate.
3.4 Competitive decentralized equilibrium
The Competitive Decentralized Equilibrium (CDE) is de￿ned as the set of alloca-
tions (nt;ct+1;ht+1;￿) such that: (i) households maximize utility given economic
policy; (ii) markets clear; (iii) the government budget constraint is satis￿ed.
Taking into account our theoretical framework and using (17)-(19), (21)-(22)
we get the following:
Proposition 1 In a symmetric competitive decentralized equilibrium, optimal leisure,
consumption, individual human capital, total human capital and average public ed-





































































































In this section we study the dynamic path of human capital (income) under DE
and CPE.
Regarding individual human capital, in the context of DE, we conclude by
equation (5):
i) If (￿ + ￿) 2 (0;1), the economy converges monotonically to a unique steady-




ii) If ￿+￿ = 1, the human capital of every family exhibits long-run or endoge-
nous growth/decay at rate B. One can distinguish three subcases:
a) B = 1. Then ht+1 = ht, therefore the representative agent stays at his/her
initial human capital.
b) B < 1. There is monotonic convergence to a steady-state human capital
equal to zero.
c) B > 1. All families experience long-run growth at rate B:
iii) If ￿ +￿ > 1, the representative family converges to one of two steady-state
human capital levels equal to 0 and B
1
1￿￿￿￿, depending on initial conditions, i.e.
the equilibria are unstable. Speci￿cally, if h0 < B
1
1￿￿￿￿; then ht ! 0; when h0 >
B
1
1￿￿￿￿; ht ! 1 and if h0 = B
1
1￿￿￿￿human capital rests at its initial condition.
The cases of primary economic interest are i) and iic) and the conclusions may
be summarized as follows:
13Proposition 2 a) If (￿ + ￿) 2 (0;1); the representative family￿ s human capital
converges monotonically to the steady-state level B1=(1￿￿￿￿); b) If ￿ + ￿ = 1 and
B > 1 the agents￿income exhibits long-run growth.
Concering the dynamics of total human capital, they are qualitatively the same
with those of individual capital, the only di⁄erence being that total human capital
is by de￿nition higher than individual human capital.
By equations (5), (25) we conclude that the dynamics of DE and CPE are
qualitatively the same. The di⁄erences are: i) dynamics depend on (￿ + ￿ + ￿), C




1￿￿￿￿￿￿ under the former and hDE
s = B
1
1￿￿￿￿ in the latter; iii) growth
in CPE is a⁄ected also by b; ￿, compared to DE, since these parameters determine
the tax rate, therefore average education spending, which a⁄ects human capital
accumulation under CPE.
As a conclusion, the dynamics of CPE and DE allow for a variety of growth
paths, including the neoclassical and endogenous growth as subcases.
5 Comparison of education systems
5.1 Analytical results
In what follows, we compare DE and CPE. The purpose is to examine the trade-
o⁄ between market failures associated with DE, due to non-internalization of the
average human capital externalities, and government failures under CPE arising
from the government attempt to correct the resulting ine¢ ciency by using dis-
torting policy instruments, i.e income taxes. So, we compare the two systems in
terms of leisure/time devoted to education, individual and total human capital,
consumption and welfare. The results, which can be obtained analytically, are
summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 a) Leisure and time devoted to education are identical in both DE
14and CPE; b) human capital, consumption and welfare are higher under DE than















































t ￿ 1 > 0 (30)
where P =
￿
a+￿, Q = ￿ (1 + b);R = ￿ (1 + b) + 1 ￿ ￿ , S = (1 + b)(￿ + ￿):
It follows that we can obtain general results only for leisure and time devoted
to education, which are identical due to the fact that the representative old agent
maximizes the same utility function under the two regimes, while policy does not
a⁄ect the education/leisure choice. For human capital, consumption and welfare
we derived su¢ cient conditions for the ranking of DE and CPE. So, we can not
generally tell if the cost of tax distortions outweighs the bene￿t from the subsi-
dization of human capital accumulation regarding human capital and consumption
under CPE relative to DE. Therefore, since human capital and consumption are
arguments of the utility function, the welfare comparison of the two systems is
impossible analytically. However, a welfare analysis is useful even in the context
of a representative agent model as ours, since it summarizes the e⁄ects of changes
in the model￿ s parameters on utility, which the social planner aims at maximizing
through policy. In light of that, we resort to numerical analysis.
5.2 Numerical analysis
5.2.1 Steady-state analysis
We compare DE and CPE in the neoclassical growth case, where there is a unique
steady-state (case (i) in section 4). Since both education systems involve second-
best environments and there is no a priori guidance from our theoretical model
15as to which of them performs better in terms of human capital, consumption and
welfare, we evaluate the expressions D, E, F for a range of values of the model￿ s
parameters to verify if conditions (28)-(30) hold.
The baseline values for ￿;￿; ￿; ￿; ￿ were chosen based among others on the
work of Psacharopoulos (1985), Magoula, T. & G. Psacharopoulos (1997), Ace-
moglou, D. & J. Angrist (1999), Cardak (2004b), Glomm, G. & B. Ravikumar
(2001), Soares (2003). The baseline values for ￿, ￿ (strength of preferences over
leisure and elasticity of human capital accumulation with regard to time devoted
to education respectively) are set such that the optimal learning time is in line
with estimates of time devoted to schooling work. Also, ￿;b (the latter corre-
sponds to preferences for human capital bequests) are selected so that the agents
put weights on consumption, leisure and human capital bequests equal to 60%,
25% and 15% respectively (the weights are normalized so that the coe¢ cient of
consumption equals 1). The benchmark values for the elacticities of human capi-
tal accumulation with regard to average human capital, average public education
spending and parental human capital (￿;￿;￿ respectively) correspond to the aver-
age estimates provided in the literature except for the latter for which the range
of values used is so wide that we assign a relatively low value to satisfy the con-
dition for neoclassical growth. Furthermore, A (productivity of human capital
accumulation with respect to all inputs) is such that annual growth rate is pos-
itive. Initial (period 0) human capital (h0) was set arbitrarily. As a result, the
baseline parameter values are ￿ = 0:42; b = 0:25; ￿ = 0:2; ￿ = 0:15; ￿ = 0:45;
￿ = 0:1; A = 3; h0 = 5:
For these values, the optimal learning time is 32.3% of the total time endow-







s ; and UDE
s > UCPE
s :
So, CPE is superior to DE in terms of human capital (income), but DE out-
16performs CPE with respect to consumption and welfare in the steady-state. Con-
sequently, the positive welfare e⁄ects of human capital subsidization by the gov-
ernment are outweighed by the distortionary tax e⁄ects on consumption implying
a net welfare loss due to education policy.
Following the computations for the baseline parameter values, we perform a
sensitivity analysis with regard to the basic parameters to check how robust are
the benchmark results for plausible parameter con￿gurations. The ranges of values
used are such that ￿ 2 [0:08;0:58]; b 2 [0:08;0:58]; ￿ 2 [0:1;0:3]; ￿ 2 [0:05;0:25];
￿ 2 [0:35;0:55]; ￿ 2 [0:01;0:2] and are broad enough to include most empirically
plausible parameter values.
As a result, the optimal time devoted to education ranges from 14.7% to 78.9%
depending on ￿; ￿ and the second-best tax rate can be as low as 1.1% and as high
as 28.3% according to the values of b; ￿. Subsequently, we evaluate D; E; F and
the most important results are presented in ￿gure 1.
Regarding the preference parameter over human capital bequests (b), CPE is
superior to DE in terms of human capital except for low values of b. Also, CPE is
welfare superior to DE for high values of b: Furthermore, the di⁄erential in favour
of CPE with regard to both variables increases with b: This is expected, because
the higher the weight agents give to human capital bequests, the more heavily they
will be willing to invest in human capital accumulation through public education
spending. Therefore human capital and consumption increase, implying higher
welfare under CPE relative to DE (b does not a⁄ect human capital and welfare in
DE). These e⁄ects outweigh the negative impact of higher b, through the higher
optimal tax rate, on consumption and welfare.
With respect to the sensitivity of human capital with regard to average public
education spending (￿), CPE outperforms DE for moderate and high values of
￿ regarding human capital and welfare. The more e⁄ective education expendi-
17ture is in stimulating human capital accumulation, i.e the higher ￿ is, the more
favorable the comparison is for CPE (except for very low values of ￿). This is plau-
sible, because a higher elasticity of knowledge creation with respect to government
spending implies a faster accumulation of human capital for a given amount of
public resources, therefore a higher welfare, since it more than compensates for
the negative impact of the higher tax rate on consumption due to the higher ￿
under CPE (￿ does not play a role under DE).
As for the elasticity of human capital accumulation with respect to learning
time (￿), CPE is superior to DE in terms of human capital with the exception of
very high values of ￿, while DE is always welfare superior to CPE. The di⁄erential
between the two systems increases with ￿ in favour of DE. This is expected, since
a higher ￿ implies a higher reduction in the marginal contribution of learning
time to human capital accumulation under CPE relative to DE. This means that
human capital declines faster in CPE than DE and the same holds for welfare both
directly and indirectly through lower consumption, since the latter is a fraction
of human capital.
The human capital and welfare di⁄erential between DE and CPE exhibit simi-
lar qualitative behaviour with ￿ when the elasticities with respect to initial average
human capital (￿) and parental human capital (￿) vary except that the di⁄eren-
tials decrease monotonically. The rationale for this behaviour is the same as that
mentioned in the analysis referring to ￿. It should be noted that as the level of
education and development of a country increases, ￿ declines according to em-
pirical studies. Therefore, CPE seems more appropriate for primary/secondary
education and poorer countries.
The di⁄erence of the two education systems in terms of consumption behaves
in the same way as the welfare di⁄erential. This is expected, since consumption
is the dominant determinant of welfare.












except for low values of ￿ (in the latter case, the positive
e⁄ect of ￿ on ￿ outweighs the negative e⁄ect on hCPE
s , so Gs rises). Also, Gs
increases with ￿; ￿, due to the positive impact of these parameters on hCPE
s .
Finally, a higher ￿ decreases Gs, since it reduces hCPE
s .
5.2.2 Transitional dynamics
To explore the relation between DE and CPE further, we will study the tran-
sitional dynamics of human capital and welfare under the two regimes. In this
framework, we conduct simulations using the benchmark parameter values, i.e
￿ = 0:42; b = 0:25; ￿ = 0:2; ￿ = 0:15; ￿ = 0:45; ￿ = 0:1; A = 3; h0 = 5, assuming
each time period of individuals￿life lasts 35 years.
We observe that human capital (income) reaches a steady-state hDE
s = 8:85
in 13 periods in DE and hCPE
s = 9:08 in 17 periods under CPE. The faster rate
of convergence in DE is due to a higher average growth rate (0.13% yearly) in
relation to CPE (0.1%) (see ￿gure 2 for the human capital dynamics in the two
systems). As a result, per capita income converges faster at a lower steady-
state under DE compared with CPE. So, education policy increases steady-state
income at the expense of a slower rate of convergence. If we look more carefully
at the transition path, we realize that starting from the same initial income, DE is
superior to CPE up to period 5, in period 6 income is identical in the two regimes
and CPE outperfoms DE afterwards. Moreover, the di⁄erence in favour of DE
rises in the periods 1-2 and then gradually falls until CPE outstrips DE income.
However, ￿gure 3 shows that DE converges to a higher steady-state welfare
than CPE con￿rming the ￿ndings of the steady-state analysis. The time required
for convergence is 9 periods under DE and 11 periods in CPE. The faster con-
19vergence in terms of welfare of DE relative to CPE is expected, since per capita
income converges faster under DE than CPE, consumption is a fraction of income
and both determine welfare.20 Also, consumption dynamics seem to increase the
welfare convergence rate in both education systems, since steady-state welfare is
attained faster than what human capital dynamics would imply. Finally, DE is
welfare superior to CPE in all time periods.
Summarizing the above ￿ndings, education policy implies a higher steady-state
income but lower welfare compared to no government intervention. However, one
should always keep in mind that these results are sensitive to the parameter values
employed, as the steady-state analysis presented above clearly showed.
6 Conclusions
This paper has focused on the implications of decentralized education and cen-
tralized public education systems for growth and welfare. We studied education,
because human capital accumulation is a fundamental source of long-run growth
in modern economies and government intervention in the education sector is wide-
spread. The ultimate objective was to welfare rank DE and CPE, so that a formal
judgement can be made regarding their desirability as alternative ways of orga-
nizing education.
Our study shows that time spent on learning and leisure are identical in the
two regimes.
However, none of the institutional settings dominates the rest for all parameter
values in terms of human capital, consumption, welfare and growth. In light of
this, we resorted to numerical methods. As a result, in the steady-state CPE fares
better than DE in terms of welfare for moderate/strong preferences over human
capital bequests and medium/high elacticities of human capital with respect to
20Leisure, the third component of the utility function, is identical in the two regimes.
20average public education expenditures, average and parental human capital in
a neoclassical growth economy. The inverse holds for the remaining parameter
values.
So, even when we abstract from equity considerations as we do in this work,
education policy may be supported on welfare grounds. These results, if combined
with the strong capacity of public education to reduce income inequality when
asymmetric equilibria ex-post are studied (e.g Cardak, 1999) justify a prominent
role for public education.
We close with possible extensions. First, we could analyze an economy where
individuals in each generation are heterogeneous, allowing us to study the impact
of more elaborate education policies, e.g means-tested vouchers, on income dis-
tribution. Furthermore, we might study the case of progressive income taxation
and uncertainty with respect to characteristics of human capital accumulation,
e.g length of life, innate abilities etc. We leave these extensions for the future.
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank I. Holezas, L. Michelis, T. Palivos,
A Philippopoulos, N. Varsakelis, conference participants at the 51st International
Atlantic Economic Conference in Athens, Greece, the 57th Congress of the Inter-
national Institute of Public Finance in Linz, Austria, and seminar participants
at the Univerisities of Macedonia, Ioannina, Thessaly and Aristotelion University
of Thessaloniki for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of the
paper. All errors are mine.
21References
Acemoglou, D., Angrist, J., (1999). How large are social returns to education?
Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws. NBER working paper 7444, 1-43.
Azariadis, C., (1993). Intertemporal Macroeconomics, Blackwell Publishers,
Boston.
Azariadis, C., Drazen, A. (1990). Threshold externalities in economic develop-
ment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 2, 501-526.
Barro, R.J. (2001). Human capital: growth, history and policy: a session to honor
Stanley Engerman, Human capital and growth. AEA Papers and Proceedings, 91,
2, 12-17.
Belzil, C. , Hansen, J. (2003). Structural estimates of the intergenerational edu-
cation correlation. IZA discussion paper 973, December, 1-26.
Blankenau, W.F, Simpson, N.B. (2004). Public education expenditures and
growth. Journal of Development Economics, 73, 583-605.
Card, D., Krueger, A.B (1992). Does school quality matter? Returns to education
and the characteristics of public schools in the United States. Journal of Political
Economy, 100, 1-40.
Cardak, B.A (2005). Education vouchers, growth and income inequality. Macro-
economic Dynamics, 9, 98-121.
Cardak, B.A (2004a). Education choice, endogenous growth and income distribu-
tion. Economica, 71, 57-81.
Cardak, B.A (2004b). Education choice, neoclassical growth and class structure.
Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 643-666.
22Cardak, B.A (1999a). Heterogeneous preferences, education expenditures and in-
come distribution. Economic Record, 75, 228, 63-76.
Dee, T.S. (2004). Are there civic returns to education?. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 88, 9-10, 1697-1720.
De la Croix, D., Doepke, M. (2004). Journal of Development Economics, 73, 607-
629.
De la Croix, D., Michel, P. (2002). A theory of economic growth, Dynamics and
policy in overlapping generations. Cambridge University Press.
Doppelhofer, G., Miller R.I, Sala-i-Martin, X. (2004). Determinants of long-term
growth: A bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) approach. American
Economic Review, 94, 4, 813-835.
Epple, D., Romano, R.E. (1998). Competition between private and public schools,
vouchers and peer-group e⁄ects. American Economic Review, 88, 1, 33-62.
Glomm, G., Ravikumar, B. (2003). Public education and income inequality. Eu-
ropean Journal of Political Economy, 19, 4, 289-300.
Glomm, G., Ravikumar, B. (2001). Human capital accumulation and endogenous
public expenditures. Canadian Journal of Economics, 34, 3, 807-826.
Glomm, G., Ravikumar, B. (1998). Flat-rate taxes, government spending on edu-
cation, and growth. Review of Economic Dynamics, 1, 306-325.
Glomm, G. Ravikumar, B. (1992). Public versus private investment in human
capital: endogenous growth and income inequality. Journal of Political Economy,
100, 4, 818-834.
23Gradstein, M. (2000). An economic rationale for public education: the value of
commitment. Journal of Monetary Economics, 45, 463-474.
Gradstein, M., Justman, M. (2004). The melting pot and school choice. Journal
of Public Economics, article in press.
Gradstein, M., Justman, M. (2002). Education, social cohesion, and economic
growth. American Economic Review, 92, 4, 1192-1204.
Gradstein, M., Justman, M. (2000). The political economy of education, Human
capital, social capital and public schooling. European Economic Review, 44, 879-
890.
Hanushek, E.A, (2002). Publicly provided education. NBER discussion paper
8799, 1-111.
Kaganovich, M., Zilcha, I. (1999). Education, social security and growth. Journal
of Public Economics, 71, 289-309.
Lucas, R.E. (1988) On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, 22, 3-42.
Magoula, T., Psacharopoulos, G. (1997). Schooling and monetary rewards in
Greece: Contributions to a debate. Athens University of Economics and Busi-
ness, Department of Economics Working paper 90.
Meier, V. (2000). Choosing between school systems. CESIfo working paper 389,
1-10.
Nehru, V., Swanson, E., Dubey, A. (1995). A new database on human capital
stock in developing and industrial countries: sources, methodology, and results.
Journal of Development Economics, 46, 2, 379-401.
24Papke, L.E. (2004). The e⁄ects of spending on test pass rates: evidence from
Michigan. Journal of Public Economics, article in press.
Persson T., Tabellini, G. (1994). Is inequality harmful for growth? American
Economic Review, 84, 599-621.
Petrakis, P.E, Stamatakis, D., (2002). "Growth and educational levels: a compar-
ative analysis". Economics of Education Review, October, 21, 5, 513-521.
Preston, R. (2003) Public education or vouchers? The importance of heteroge-
neous preferences. The Economic Record, 79, S74-S84.
Psacharopoulos, G. (1985). Returns to education: A further international update.
Journal of Human Resources, XXIV, 583-612.
Restuccia, D., Urrutia, C. (2004). Intergenerational persistence of earnings: The
role of early and college education. American Economic Review, 94, 5, 1354-1378.
Soares, J. (2003). Self-interest and public funding of education. Journal of Public
Economics, 87, 703-727.
Temple, J. (2001). Growth e⁄ects of education and social capital in the OECD
countries. OECD Economic Studies, O(33), 57-101.
Thum, C., Uebelmesser, S. (2003). Mobility and the role of education as a com-
mitment device. International Tax and Public Finance, 10, 549-564.
Viaene, J-M, Zilcha, I. (2001). Human capital formation, income inequality and
growth. Eitan Berglas School of Economics working paper, 13, 1-21.
Zhang, J. (1996). Optimal public investments in education and endogenous
growth. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98, 3, 387-404.






















































































0 5 10 15 20 25
t
U
Ucpe
Ude
27